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Supporting the Iraq War and the Decision President Bush Did Not Make
David Frum is the author of five books, including two New York Times bestsellers: THE RIGHT MAN: The Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush (2003), and co-author with Richard Perle of AN END TO EVIL: What's Next in the War on Terror (2004).
Frum is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and writes a daily column for National Review Online. He contributes frequently to the editorial pages of The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal, as well as the Great Britain's Daily Telegraph and Canada's National Post. He appears regularly on CNN, Fox News, and the BBC. In 2001-2002, David Frum served as a speechwriter and special assistant to President George W. Bush.
David Frum: I wasn't in support of the way it was done the first time around. I was on the losing side of a lot of bureaucratic battles. I'm not important enough to be on any side, but my point of view was on the losing side of important bureaucratic battles in 2002 and 2003.
I think a big part of what went wrong in Iraq was the original conception was that the United States would race into Iraq, overthrow Saddam Hussein, install a provisional government made up of Iraqis and get out as rapidly as possible. We then had a terrible internal argument inside the United States government where the people who were envisioned as that provisional government were vetoed. Now maybe that was a good decision; maybe it was a bad decision. But it meant that we raced into Iraq with no idea, with no plan for what was to come next; and because there never was an alternative to a provisional government idea.
Let me start this all over again because it's too complicated.
During the debate over the Iraq war, to simplify a little, there were two competing ideas in the United States government about how to do Iraq. One idea, broadly, says Donald Rumsfeld, was, "This is not a war, it's a raid. What we're going to do, is we've got 70,000 troops, race them up the Tigris and the Euphrates, capture or kill Saddam Hussein, install a provisional government and then get out, and wish them well."
The other view, which coalesced around Colin Powell, was that first view is completely irresponsible: "It can never work that way. What we need to do is we need to accept that if we go into Iraq, the provisional people are no good, they are tainted in all kinds of way. We are going to have to do a long slow process of developing Iraqi institutions. That will take five years, maybe 10. And that means we're going to need a massive occupying army, which means 70,000 won't do it, we need 350,000; we need to stay a decade."
Now, these were two starkly different visions of how to proceed. And who knows which one was the right one. We ended up melding them together in an especially disastrous way, which is we did Donald Rumsfeld's war and Colin Powell's peace, because we were sending 70,000 people racing up-- I think in the end it was 130,000-- racing up the Tigris and the Euphrates and then we are not installing a provisional government, then we are going to do an occupation that is going to last five or 10 years while we try to build all sorts of Iraqi institutions.
Now, obviously that was a formula for failure and it was a formula for failure because we put together two parts of absolutely predictability that would not work. And when I look back on the way the decision making was done, the great tragedy was that there should have been a moment, and there are institutions in the government to force this, if somebody had said, "Mr. President [George W. Bush], the war plan and the peace plan do not add up together, they won't work. You have to either have a peace plan that follows your war plan, or a war plan that is consistent with your peace plan, or you have to forget the whole thing."
So here's what we end up doing, we send 130,000 troops racing up river. We do seize Baghdad and then we stop and we ask each other what happens now. And there's a week of uncertainty and at the end of the week the president calls Paul Bremmer and says, "I'd like you to be my pro-counsel in Baghdad."
Now, Bremmer is a highly dedicated public servant, a very intelligent man, with a distinguished record. He doesn’t speak Arabic, he's not a Middle East specialist and anyway, it wouldn't matter if he were, he's not an Iraqi, he's obviously a foreigner. And when you install him in that kind of off the cuff way, you are simply asking for trouble.
This decision to install Bremmer was the product of a failure to make a decision a year earlier, about what the government of liberated Iraq was going to look like. We began our conversation by talking about the malperformance [sic] of the U.S. government and this is just one of the most extreme instances. The idea that you would go to war without having had an agreement inside your government about what you're going to do after the war.
And I'll say here, because I was a very unimportant but well placed observer of these events, what I believe would happen, I could have had this same conversation with you in 2002, and I would have said these are the things that are happening that I'm really worried about. But what I would then have said, and this is where I was really wrong, "Since it will obviously be a catastrophe if we arrive in Baghdad without a clear plan for what comes next, therefore it follows that there must be a solution that is going to be agreed upon, and I hope the president [George W. Bush] will choose the one that my faction favors. But maybe we'll be overruled and we'll choose the one that the other faction favors. But he will certainly have to make a choice because there's no way that we're going to go to war to overthrow a regime without a clear idea for what happens on overthrow day plus 10." And that is what happened.
David Frum: I wouldn't say "unable," but he failed to make the decision and historians will then spend the next 30 years arguing about why that decision was not made. But it was not made.
David Frum: I was sympathetic to the Defense point of view.
David Frum: I didn't choose him.
Look, here's the case with Chalabi, which is, if we're already getting rid of Saddam, we want to replace Saddam not with an American pro-counsel, but with an Iraqi provisional government. Well, where would we find such a thing?
Well as it happens, there is this group of exiled Iraqis who have themselves formed an organization, and it was a pretty big group of people canvassing a pretty wide range of points of view, from religious people to Iraqi communists, to Shiites and Sunnis together and we're talking about many hundreds of people. And they had formed an organization and they had agreed that Chalabi was going to be the man in charge of it.
So he wasn't an American choice, he was the choice who had sort of come up through this system of exile politics. Now, what the [US] State department would argue against him was, one, exile politics aren't going to work; that's a big mistake; we shouldn’t rely on exiles, we have to rely on indigenous people. Problem: There aren't any indigenous people, because the brave ones are dead, and the others are compromised and anyway, it's going to be hard to find.
So that was the case with Chalabi, he was not the American choice, it was rather he was the man who happened to be leading the closest thing to a provisional government that there was to find.
But I had no brief for Chalabi personally. In fact this was part of the crossfire that happened. There were different bureaucratic camps that each had their own favorite Iraqi. So it was certainly true that the vice president [Dick Cheney] and the civilians in the Defense Department preferred Chalabi, and the people at the State department preferred Adnan al-Pachachi, who had important roles in the pre-Saddam government, and then the CIA and the British tended to prefer a man named Nuri al-Maliki, who would later go on to be prime minister of Iraq.
And I have to say, even at the time and certainly now, it almost didn't matter which one of those guys we picked; pick one. But don't pick Paul Bremmer. Any one of them would have been a better choice than Paul Bremmer--because this is a society that not only was brutalized and oppressed, it was also deeply humiliated.
This was a mistake that we very nearly made in World War II. When President Roosevelt got on so badly with Charles de Gaulle, he never appreciated how important it was that the French felt that they had liberated themselves, and the failure to give de Gaulle enough of a role, to make it feel like the French had liberated themselves, whether that was right or not, was a big irritant in American-French relations, and continues to this day.
It's very important not to do favors for people; they don't forgive you for doing favors for them. Whereas if you can say, we helped you do a favor for yourself, you liberated yourself, we provided the instrumentalities, but you are the heroes, you deserve the credit, you owe us nothing, we're just glad that our interests overlapped, you have a much healthier relationship going forward, and that was the path that we did not take.
Recorded on: May 5, 2008.
Frum explains why he supported the war and what George W. Bush did wrong.
If machines develop consciousness, or if we manage to give it to them, the human-robot dynamic will forever be different.
- Does AI—and, more specifically, conscious AI—deserve moral rights? In this thought exploration, evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, ethics and tech professor Joanna Bryson, philosopher and cognitive scientist Susan Schneider, physicist Max Tegmark, philosopher Peter Singer, and bioethicist Glenn Cohen all weigh in on the question of AI rights.
- Given the grave tragedy of slavery throughout human history, philosophers and technologists must answer this question ahead of technological development to avoid humanity creating a slave class of conscious beings.
- One potential safeguard against that? Regulation. Once we define the context in which AI requires rights, the simplest solution may be to not build that thing.
Duke University researchers might have solved a half-century old problem.
- Duke University researchers created a hydrogel that appears to be as strong and flexible as human cartilage.
- The blend of three polymers provides enough flexibility and durability to mimic the knee.
- The next step is to test this hydrogel in sheep; human use can take at least three years.
Duke researchers have developed the first gel-based synthetic cartilage with the strength of the real thing. A quarter-sized disc of the material can withstand the weight of a 100-pound kettlebell without tearing or losing its shape.
Photo: Feichen Yang.<p>That's the word from a team in the Department of Chemistry and Department of Mechanical Engineering and Materials Science at Duke University. Their <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/adfm.202003451" target="_blank">new paper</a>, published in the journal,<em> Advanced Functional Materials</em>, details this exciting evolution of this frustrating joint.<br></p><p>Researchers have sought materials strong and versatile enough to repair a knee since at least the seventies. This new hydrogel, comprised of three polymers, might be it. When two of the polymers are stretched, a third keeps the entire structure intact. When pulled 100,000 times, the cartilage held up as well as materials used in bone implants. The team also rubbed the hydrogel against natural cartilage a million times and found it to be as wear-resistant as the real thing. </p><p>The hydrogel has the appearance of Jell-O and is comprised of 60 percent water. Co-author, Feichen Yang, <a href="https://today.duke.edu/2020/06/lab-first-cartilage-mimicking-gel-strong-enough-knees" target="_blank">says</a> this network of polymers is particularly durable: "Only this combination of all three components is both flexible and stiff and therefore strong." </p><p> As with any new material, a lot of testing must be conducted. They don't foresee this hydrogel being implanted into human bodies for at least three years. The next step is to test it out in sheep. </p><p>Still, this is an exciting step forward in the rehabilitation of one of our trickiest joints. Given the potential reward, the wait is worth it. </p><p><span></span>--</p><p><em>Stay in touch with Derek on <a href="http://www.twitter.com/derekberes" target="_blank">Twitter</a>, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DerekBeresdotcom" target="_blank">Facebook</a> and <a href="https://derekberes.substack.com/" target="_blank">Substack</a>. His next book is</em> "<em>Hero's Dose: The Case For Psychedelics in Ritual and Therapy."</em></p>
What would it be like to experience the 4th dimension?
Physicists have understood at least theoretically, that there may be higher dimensions, besides our normal three. The first clue came in 1905 when Einstein developed his theory of special relativity. Of course, by dimensions we’re talking about length, width, and height. Generally speaking, when we talk about a fourth dimension, it’s considered space-time. But here, physicists mean a spatial dimension beyond the normal three, not a parallel universe, as such dimensions are mistaken for in popular sci-fi shows.
An algorithm may allow doctors to assess PTSD candidates for early intervention after traumatic ER visits.
- 10-15% of people visiting emergency rooms eventually develop symptoms of long-lasting PTSD.
- Early treatment is available but there's been no way to tell who needs it.
- Using clinical data already being collected, machine learning can identify who's at risk.
The psychological scars a traumatic experience can leave behind may have a more profound effect on a person than the original traumatic experience. Long after an acute emergency is resolved, victims of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) continue to suffer its consequences.
In the U.S. some 30 million patients are annually treated in emergency departments (EDs) for a range of traumatic injuries. Add to that urgent admissions to the ED with the onset of COVID-19 symptoms. Health experts predict that some 10 percent to 15 percent of these people will develop long-lasting PTSD within a year of the initial incident. While there are interventions that can help individuals avoid PTSD, there's been no reliable way to identify those most likely to need it.
That may now have changed. A multi-disciplinary team of researchers has developed a method for predicting who is most likely to develop PTSD after a traumatic emergency-room experience. Their study is published in the journal Nature Medicine.
70 data points and machine learning
Image source: Creators Collective/Unsplash
Study lead author Katharina Schultebraucks of Columbia University's Department Vagelos College of Physicians and Surgeons says:
"For many trauma patients, the ED visit is often their sole contact with the health care system. The time immediately after a traumatic injury is a critical window for identifying people at risk for PTSD and arranging appropriate follow-up treatment. The earlier we can treat those at risk, the better the likely outcomes."
The new PTSD test uses machine learning and 70 clinical data points plus a clinical stress-level assessment to develop a PTSD score for an individual that identifies their risk of acquiring the condition.
Among the 70 data points are stress hormone levels, inflammatory signals, high blood pressure, and an anxiety-level assessment. Says Schultebraucks, "We selected measures that are routinely collected in the ED and logged in the electronic medical record, plus answers to a few short questions about the psychological stress response. The idea was to create a tool that would be universally available and would add little burden to ED personnel."
Researchers used data from adult trauma survivors in Atlanta, Georgia (377 individuals) and New York City (221 individuals) to test their system.
Of this cohort, 90 percent of those predicted to be at high risk developed long-lasting PTSD symptoms within a year of the initial traumatic event — just 5 percent of people who never developed PTSD symptoms had been erroneously identified as being at risk.
On the other side of the coin, 29 percent of individuals were 'false negatives," tagged by the algorithm as not being at risk of PTSD, but then developing symptoms.
Image source: Külli Kittus/Unsplash
Schultebraucks looks forward to more testing as the researchers continue to refine their algorithm and to instill confidence in the approach among ED clinicians: "Because previous models for predicting PTSD risk have not been validated in independent samples like our model, they haven't been adopted in clinical practice." She expects that, "Testing and validation of our model in larger samples will be necessary for the algorithm to be ready-to-use in the general population."
"Currently only 7% of level-1 trauma centers routinely screen for PTSD," notes Schultebraucks. "We hope that the algorithm will provide ED clinicians with a rapid, automatic readout that they could use for discharge planning and the prevention of PTSD." She envisions the algorithm being implemented in the future as a feature of electronic medical records.
The researchers also plan to test their algorithm at predicting PTSD in people whose traumatic experiences come in the form of health events such as heart attacks and strokes, as opposed to visits to the emergency department.