How do you see this fitting with Aristotle's discussion of virtue ethics and eudamonia? In particular, I'm thinking about his ideas expressed in the Nicomachean Ethics, where the goal is to train yourself over time to live in such a way as to do what is right, which also turns out to be what is good for us. According to Aristotle then, acting virtuously is a source of pleasure- natural happiness as Gilbert refers to it elsewhere, while also ensuring synthetic happiness. Since acting virtuously requires certain behaviors and bars others, synthetic happiness would be the result of our being glad about the things we chose NOT to do. Even, or especially, when those choices were particularly tempting. If the difficulties we have in being happy are linked to our poor affective forecasting skills, then a training in those actions that would help us more reliably forecast can only be beneficial. Virtue ethics would then be a way to: 1. more accurately forecast those actions that would make us happy 2. help us feel good about those tempting possibilities that we rejected 3. give us a sense of immediate gratification from our being virtuous. My question here is whether this seems like a fair way to tie Aristotelian ethics to what gilbert is talking about-- am I trying too hard to make things fit which actually do not? What other ways might we be able to tie this research gilbert is doing now to our great thinkers of the past?