Description: Ross believes that the Bush administration will be remembered for its faith-based assessments that ignore the facts on the ground.

Transcript:  Well I wouldn’t have written the book if I thought their use of statecraft was particularly good.  Unfortunately, I think they really haven’t known how to . . . to conduct statecraft, mostly because they have been driven largely by an ideological set of assumptions.  They have not had reality-based assessments.  Now when I say “use reality-based assessments to shape your objectives”, I’m not saying you have to give up your ambition.  But you can’t change unacceptable realities if you don’t understand the reality in the first place.  What, in a sense, led us astray in Iraq was having faith-based assessments, not reality-based assessments.  It wasn’t unknowable that we would face an insurgency.  It wasn’t unknowable that there could be a sectarian conflict.  It wasn’t unknowable that looting might take place in the aftermath of Ssaddam Hussein.  All of these were knowable, but we didn’t know it because we were driven by an ideological view of Iraq as opposed to a reality-based view of Iraq.  Our premise was everything will fall into place when Saddam Hussein falls, not fall apart.  And when it fell apart, we were clueless as to what to do.  So that has had a profound effect on the standing of the United States, because when you had a huge gap between your objectives and the means that you employ, and you’re not effective, you’re gonna lose your credibility.  When you’re seen as not listening to others; when you’re seen as, in a sense, shaping objectives and being impervious, which frequently has appeared to be the case, then once again you’re going to affect the perception of others of you.  Today, if you look at it, you know the fact is the Bush administration is not always wrong.  But you wouldn’t know it by the way the rest of the world reacts, including our allies, which is a kind of reflexive, negative response to almost anything the Bush administration wants to do.  Well that’s part of a legacy.  That’s part of a legacy of how we’ve dealt with others.  It’s part of a legacy of how we’ve conducted statecraft.  It’s part of a legacy of, in a sense, being ineffective and losing enormous credibility in the process because of our ineffectiveness.

Recorded on: 9/12/07