Bookmark and Share

10:36

Interview Transcript

Discuss

User_ryjq_abdcc5a51

Greg Tully on June 5, 2009, 8:24 AM

 

The problem as a whole is clearly complex and multifaceted. I would dare to make once concrete suggestion that appears to be correct, although I am not an economist and I have not analyzed this suggestion rigorously.

That said, I think that an important part of the problem are the huge information asymmetries arising out of the underwriting function — in bonds, in equity securities, and in mortgages. The underwriters are the agents that are the closest to the recipients of capital and other than the recipients themselves have the most information about the current economic position and future prospects of these capital recipients. I believe that inadequate disclosure of all the information possessed by the underwriters was a material factor both in the dotcom bubble and the mortgage bubble. The information available to market participants will almost never be as valuable as that possessed by the original underwriters, who frequently have inadequate (or no) incentives for truly full disclosure. to me, this is clearly true for mortgage underwriting when the payoffs to that function are disconnected from the performance of the mortgagee such as with securitization. Even when prospectuses are required, these documents are so full of generic boilerplate disclaimers with respect to prospects and risk pertaining to future performance as to be essentially worthless to an investor far removed from the transaction. So, I believe that redesigning the regulations governing the underwriting function’s information gathering and disclosure responsibilities is very likely to be an important component of improving our capital accumulation and allocation systems going forward.

 


Add a Comment

You must be logged in to comment. Log in or Register